Abstract When, in , William Carlos Williams defined a poem as ''a small (or large) machine made of words,'' he had in mind as a model for poetry the precision machines of speed and power celebrated by other modernist writers and visual artists. But this was not the only machine model current in the modernist era, for on the margins of mainstream modernism were ''alternative'' machines, machines of reproduction and simulation-writing-machines, imaging-machines, duplicating-machines -such as those of Alfred Jarry, Marcel Duchamp, Franz Kafka, and, especially, Raymond Roussel. Such machines have proliferated in the postmodern period and provide the model for ''mechanical'' writing practices in postmodernist poetry. The present essay examines the heterogeneity of postmodernist machine-writing practices and seeks, however provisionally, to reduce that heterogeneity to some degree of conceptual order. Four representative texts are examined in some detail: a short acrostic poem by Jackson Mac Low; Harry Mathews's exposition of ''Mathews's Algorithm,'' a method for permuting texts; a text by Raymond Federman that observes certain rigid formal-compositional constraints; and a prose poem by Charles O. Hartman, which was generated in collaboration with a computer program called Prose. Next, I outline five possible typologies of machine poetry, none of which is fully adequate to the range of phenomena in question, although the fifth one proves less inadequate than the others. First, however, two binary partitions of the field-texts generated by actual machines versus those generated by virtual machines and composition by chance processes versus composition by fixed (arbitrary) procedures-are tested and
found wanting. I then develop a grid of four categories: skeleton procedures, selection constraints, combination procedures, and combination constraints. Next I consider two spectra, or scales, to measure the degrees of involvement in the poem's production (degrees of interactivity) by the reader and the writer. Finally, I examine some of the consequences of machine poetry, including its consequences for the notion of the poet's ''authority,'' for the generic identity of poetry, and, finally, for the estranging light that machine writing retrospectively sheds on the entire history of poetry. In that light, all poetry, indeed all language use whatsoever, appears to be what Donna Haraway terms a cyborg phenomenon-a human being coupled to a machine-or what David Wills characterizes as a prosthesis. Mechanical composition functions in this context as a scale model and a heuristic device, figuring in miniature the larger language-machine and rendering that language-machine visible.
The Modernist Machine and Its Other
''A poem,'' William Carlos Williams (: ) wrote in , ''is a small (or large) machine made of words.'' What he had in mind, presumably, as models for poetry were the sorts of machines celebrated by his friends, the Precisionist painters Charles Demuth and Charles Sheeler, or by Delaunay or Léger or the Italian Futurists: dynamos, factories, motorcars, airplanes, ocean liners, sculptures of speed and energy (see Jameson : -; Watten a) . Or perhaps what Williams (: -) had in mind was something like the power plant in his own poem, ''Classic Scene'':
A power-house in the shape of a red brick chair  feet high on the seat of which sit the figures of two metal stacks-aluminumThe poem holds the mirror up to the powerhouse in more than one sense. On the one hand, the relationship between them is straightforwardly representational: the verbal text represents the object-machine in the sense of describing or evoking it. But their relationship is also one of modeling: in the precision-engineered working of its component parts (neutral diction, short grammatical units, compact lines), Williams's small machine models the machine qualities of the powerhouse, but on a miniature scale.
While this powerhouse might have been the sort of machine Williams used as a model for his poetry, and while it is certainly the kind of mechanism we most readily associate with modernism, it is not the only machine model of the period. On the margins of mainstream modernism there were alternative machines, ''bachelor machines'' as they have been called (Deleuze and Guattari ; de Certeau ), such as those of Alfred Jarry, Marcel Duchamp, Franz Kafka, and Raymond Roussel. 1 These are not machines of speed and power, but rather machines of reproduction and simulation: writing-machines, imaging-machines, duplicating-machines. The writing/torture machine of Kafka's ''In the Penal Colony,'' if not exactly typical, is certainly a memorable example (see Deleuze and Guattari ; Benesch ) . Marginal in modernist imagery, such alternative machines proliferate in postmodernist art; indeed, the displacement of the speed-andenergy model of the machine by the reproduction-and-simulation model is one of the distinguishing marks of postmodernism. 2 The most interesting bachelor machines of the modernist era are no doubt Roussel's; for example, the water-driven loom of Impressions of Africa that weaves images or the flying paving-machine of Locus Solus that produces mosaics. A Roussel machine is always, apart from anything else, a kind of scale model or mise-en-abyme of the procedures by which the text housing it was itself produced; for, as Roussel revealed in his posthumous poetics, Comment j'ai écrit certains de mes livres [How I wrote certain of my books], these texts were not ''freely'' composed but produced by the operation of mechanical techniques for generating and/or manipulating bits of language . The term bachelor machines (machines célibataires) derives from the title of Marcel Duchamp's Large Glass, also called La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même [The bride stripped bare by her bachelors, even]. Michel Carrouges () proposed this umbrella term for the entire category of modernist-era alternative machines, of which Duchamp's enigmatic image of robotic sexuality was, in his view, paradigmatic. See also Deleuze and Guattari ; de Certeau ; and Watten a. . Jameson (: -) contrasts ''classic'' modernist machines of speed and energy with postmodernist representations of machines of reproduction (movie and video technology, audiotaping, computer simulation and representations of data, etc. (Roussel ; see Foucault ) . A Roussel text, in other words, is already a full level higher on the scale of ''mechanization'' than a Williams text: it is not a ''machine made of words,'' but rather a ''machine made of words made by a machine.'' That Roussel's are the most interesting of the modernist era alternative machines is not simply my judgment but rather a reflection of Roussel's delayed but proliferating impact in our own era. First ''discovered'' by the surrealists, and claimed by them as a precursor, Roussel was ''rediscovered'' in the late s by John Ashbery, who transmitted his find to the other New York School poets (see Lehman : -); almost simultaneously he was taken up by the French nouveaux romanciers, then by French theorists (Foucault, de Certeau, Deleuze, and Guattari) and the OuLiPo circle of avant-garde experimentalists. In light of the surprising infectiousness of Roussel's influence, it is tempting to ascribe all postmodernist machine writing to this single source. In fact, there were multiple sources, and not everyone who appears to share Roussel's machine aesthetics was actually indebted to him, or even aware of him. Barrett Watten (b), for one, argues that machine writing (or one aspect of it at any rate) was invented independently by American modernists such as Louis Zukofsky, who in turn transmitted it to John Cage, Jackson Mac Low, and others in the American avant-garde tradition. No doubt there were other sources as well. 3 It is this multiple and ramifying genealogy, among other things, that explains the extreme heterogeneity of machine-writing practices in contemporary poetry.The object of the present essay is to reduce this heterogeneity to some degree of conceptual order, however provisionally. Before proceeding to that task, however, we need to sample the range of practices that fall under the rubric of postmodernist machine writing.
. New sources are always being found, or retrospectively fabricated. The Scottish poet Andrew Greig, for instance, models the collage techniques of his long narrative poem Western Swing () on the technique of sampling used in music production (a recent technology) but traces its origins back to the high modernists, Eliot, Pound, and, especially, MacDiarmid. The precursor of his sampling practice is alleged to be the ''MacDiarmidtron,'' which, Greig (ibid.: ) clarifies, ''is an early sequencer . . . that shifts linguistic register to a dense Scots from many parts and periods.'' It could be argued that the writing-machine predates Roussel and other modernists by a full two centuries, having been anticipated by Swift in the language-machine of Lagado (Gulliver's Travels, III, v A particularly transparent example of composition by machine, this appears at first glance to be an acrostic poem. In each stanza, the first letters of the words of line  spell out call; of line , me; and of line , Ishmael. But if this poem is an acrostic, it is hardly one in the traditional sense. Traditionally, the acrostic method serves to showcase the poet's own ingenuity and resourcefulness, his or her ability to make good (and if possible witty) sense while still satisfying the condition of spelling out a phrase, name, or other word with (typically) the initial letters of each line of the poem. Far from showcasing his skills, however, Mac Low has in effect surrendered part of his autonomy as a poet, allowing the method itself to generate the poem. Mac Low's (: -) ''Note on the Methods Used in Composing & Performing Stanzas for Iris Lezak'' (the volume containing ''Call Me Ishmael'') explains the procedure by which he generated the poem. He describes how, over a period of time (May through October ), he composed (or should one say compiled?) poems from the books he was reading while commuting to and from work on the subway, inventing various . I have written about this example before in the pages of this journal; see McHale : -. a priori procedures for determining which words to lift from the book to use, in which order, in ''his'' own poem. He does not specify exactly which procedure he used for ''Call Me Ishmael,'' but we can readily reconstruct it once we identify his source text, namely, the first chapter, ''Loomings,'' of Melville's ( [] : ) Moby-Dick.
Call me Ishmael. Some years ago-never mind how long precisely-having little or no money in my purse, and nothing particular to interest me on shore, I thought I would sail about a little and see the watery part of the world. It is a way I have of driving off the spleen, and regulating the circulation. Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; whenever it is a damp, drizzly November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarily pausing before coffin warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I meet; and especially whenever my hypos get such an upper hand of me, that it requires a strong moral principle to prevent me from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically knocking people's hats off-then, I account it high time to get to sea as soon as I can. This is my substitute for pistol and ball. With a philosophical flourish Cato throws himself upon his sword; I quietly take to the ship. There is nothing surprising in this. If they but knew it, almost all men in their degree, some time or other, cherish very nearly the same feelings towards the ocean with me.
I have italicized all the words Mac Low used from this first paragraph of Melville's first chapter. The procedures he followed must have been something like this: () Use the letters of the first sentence of the chapter as a template for determining selections from the source text. () To compose the first stanza, select from the source text the first word with an initial c (circulation), then the first word with an initial a (and), then the first with an initial l (long; double that word), then the first with an initial m (mind ) and so on. () To compose the second stanza, select the second word with an initial c, then the second word with an initial a, then the second word with an initial l, and so on. Compose the third stanza by selecting the third word with each of the respective initial letters, the fourth stanza by selecting the fourth word, and so on. () If the word is followed by a punctuation mark, retain it; retain the upper case when it occurs but also capitalize the initial word of each line and the word after full stops. Following these procedures, one produces, as if mechanically, a new text, all of whose materials derive from a prior source text. 5 The second example is not a poem but an algorithm for producing poems In short, Mathews's algorithm can potentially function as a novel-machine as readily as it does as a poem-machine. The third example is neither a poem nor an algorithm for producing poems but a short quasi-narrative text: Raymond Federman's Voice in the Closet (). Although Federman's fiction often thematizes constraint, 6 The Voice in the Closet is almost unique among his writings in its application of constraints to the actual production of the text. The text of Voice was generated by observing rigid formal-compositional constraints: the words must form perfect rectangles; there must be eighteen lines per page and sixty-eight characters per line (including spaces; and no punctuation marks, blank spaces at the end of a line, extra spacing between words, or hyphenation of words at line ends can be used to make the character count come out right (see Figure ) . Thus, the exactness of the line length (i.e., of the character count) can only be secured by labor-intensive editing. ''Think of . Federman's fictions often systematically explore or exhaust artificially constrained situations; for example, in Double or Nothing ( [] ), the narrator-protagonist obsessively budgets supplies for the year he spends closed up in a room writing Double or Nothing. the madness,'' writes Federman of Voice in a companion novel, The Twofold Vibration (: ), ''of sketching all these possible words into an appropriate form, the desire and the need to add more, the excitement of chance too, but also think of the cool restraint, the control, the necessary calculation, to the point of counting the number of letters in words to justify their presence, or their elimination, think of the extreme reserve and the cunning, ah yes the cunning that such a game presupposes.'' Moreover, Voice is a doubled text, with the English version bound back-to-back to a French version that was composed under analogous but slightly different constraints (presumably to accommodate the different demands of the French language): ninetyfive characters per line instead of sixty-eight, but fourteen lines per page instead of eighteen, and twenty-two pages instead of the twenty pages of the English version (see Figure ) .
''Boxes of words, words abandoned to deliberate chaos and yet boxed into The court of color is atmosphere. Light in the spring marches, but place is the true science. While metabolism types us, the oak has worked through brick, and breath knows ghosts.
II
Before creation, the voice of woman (a dark dark) was numbering earth, as an easy sea does.
This text is one of the fruits of several experiments in using (or collaborating with) computer programs to compose poetry, as reported in Hartman's Virtual Muse (). In this case, the program in question, called Prose, comprised a grammar capable of generating a number of English sentence types and a lexicon capable of slotting grammatically (though not necessarily semantically) appropriate words into these sentences. The lexicon had been compiled from five thousand of the most common words on a word-frequency list, but with certain especially ''flat'' (unexpressive) words omitted and a selection of especially ''interesting'' words added. The program's output was treated as a first draft; that is, it was subject to considerable editing and revision by Hartman. Thus, what Prose actually generated reads as follows: ''The court of color (radiation of the center) is stress above any building. Light inside the spring marched, but I am place of the science. Since metabolism is typing me, the oak throughout brick has worked. A party up steel: the shot of time. What is a church increasing? Before I have made us, the voice of woman (a dark dark) was numbering earth, and an easy sea does'' (: ). From this raw material Hartman produced the ''cooked'' version in ''Seventy-Six Assertions.''
The resulting text sounds remarkably like so-called New Sentence poetry-like the work of Ron Silliman, say, or perhaps like Rosmarie Waldrop's. In fact, most of the computer-generated poetry exhibited by Hartman in the appendix to Virtual Muse reads like some mode or other of contemporary American avant-garde writing. 7 What explains this convergence? Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, Hartman might, of course, simply have shaped the computer outputs in the editing process so that they reflected contemporary modes; comparison of the raw Prose output with ''Seventy-Six Assertions'' indicates that he must have done this to some degree. Secondly, and more interestingly, contemporary modes perhaps involve forms of disjunction similar to those occurring in computergenerated texts.Thirdly, and most interestingly of all for my purposes, some of the poems closest in mode to the computer-generated texts may themselves have been generated ''mechanically,'' in more or less the same way Hartman's texts were-with or without the assistance of a computer program. There is a good deal of evidence tending to confirm this last possibility; that is, that contemporary disjunctive poetry is, in many cases, machine poetry.
Four Abortive Typologies (and One Qualified Success)
I have, admittedly, selected the preceding examples for their heterogeneity, though that heterogeneity accurately reflects the range of machine-writing practices from which they were chosen. The challenge, then, is to discover a nontrivial, well-motivated, versatile, and (as nearly as possible) exhaustive typology adequate to encompass this diverse phenomenon. Let me, right at the outset, confess my failure to discover such a typology. Failures though they may be, however, I am not embarrassed to expose my tentative typologies to scrutiny, because the value of any typology, adequate and in- adequate alike, is what it reveals about the phenomena being categorized. A perfectly airtight, leakproof taxonomic schema is not inevitably valuable in itself and, indeed, might prove less valuable than a taxonomy that failed for interesting (and explicable) reasons. Herewith, then, five attempted typologies of machine poetry, all more or less inadequate, although the last one seems somewhat less inadequate than the others. I begin with a simple binary partition of the field.
Texts Generated by Actual Machines versus Those Generated by Virtual Machines (Algorithms) This typology reveals itself almost immediately to be a trivial and misleading dichotomy. There is no essential difference between algorithms applied ''by hand'' (e.g., by Mac Low or Mathews) and those, admittedly more complex methods, run on a machine (e.g., Hartman's Prose program). Both are equally mechanical. A software program like Hartman's is an algorithm; but an algorithm like Mathews's or a procedure like Mac Low's is also a piece of software, and a real (hardware) machine could easily be programmed to run it. Conversely, the use of an actual machine at some stage in the process does not of itself guarantee that a text has been machine generated. For example, Jim Rosenberg's hypertext poems, ''Diffractions Through'' and ''The Barrier Frames'' (), cannot be read except on a computer and in fact exist nowhere outside a computer. Yet these poems do not for this reason belong to the same category as Hartman's.
So perhaps we need to distinguish between machine-generated poetry (Hartman's) and machine-mediated poetry (Rosenberg's). Hartman's program composes poetry (with Hartman's collaboration), while Rosenberg's software merely displays his. 8 We must not, however, underestimate the potential impact of a mechanical medium on the composition of poetry using that medium, even when the machine has not, in a strict sense, been used to generate the text. This point is made with particular cogency by Armand Schwerner, a poet who began, late in his life, to experiment with the capacity of Macintosh font-generating software to generate new pictographs.
. To be precise, Rosenberg does use mechanical (algorithmic) means to generate reservoirs of words from which he culls his poems; but these mechanical methods of preselection are unrelated to the hypertext medium through which he displays his poems. ''I don't use algorithms to generate 'finished material,' but I do use chance operations a good deal to algorithmically generate precompositional material. I have what I call reservoirs-somewhat like Jackson [Mac Low]'s vocabularies-which I chop into small fragments, randomly permute the fragments, print this out as a prose block, then use this for what I call a prompt sheet. I use it as the basis for composing the next-level reservoir, or in the last case the finished phrases. So there is generated text in my 'practice' but it doesn't show as 'finish' '' (Jim Rosenberg, personal communication, October , ).
He then ''translated'' the pictographs as if they were characters of a hithertounknown writing system. 9 Schwerner (: ) describes the ''reciprocating process between the computer's technically generated means and the composer'' as follows: ''There is the composer's purpose, and there are the available means; the latter can suggest an authorial intention still under wraps, not yet embodiable. . . . Readiness to receive suggestions through computer programs' technical possibilities can imply high degrees of creative cooperation, not mechanistic indenture. '' In much the same way, Rosenberg's poetry is literally inconceivable without the hypertext software; his practice involves rising to the occasion presented by his medium to explore its potential. Similarly, at an earlier period, the availability of typewriting technology altered poets' practice, placing within their control elements of lineation and spacing (especially) that had formerly been the province of typesetters; Williams, for instance, and later Charles Olson, rose to the opportunities presented by the typewriter and explored its potential (Hartman : -, ). Nor has the typewriter's potential as a medium been exhausted, even in our own time. As recently as twenty years ago, Federman's Voice in the Closet would have been inconceivable without the medium of the electric typewriter; he even identifies it in the text's first line, ''selectricstud makes me speak with its balls,'' presumably alluding to the IBM Selectric's print ball. However, Voice seems to me a case in which machine mediation becomes indistinguishable from machine generation: the text is in some sense ''made'' by observing the constraints imposed by the Selectric's mechanical spacing.
This typology having proven inadequate, for the simple reason that the distinction between actual and virtual machines (between hardware and software) fails to capture any essential difference, let's consider a different binary opposition. bines arbitrary and chance procedures in one and the same writing practice, so placing his texts in one or another category would be a misrepresentation, and the same goes for many other machine-poetry practitioners. More damagingly still, Conte's terminology proves, on closer examination, to be mistaken.
Hartman (: ) clarifies the problem: we need to distinguish the aleatory not only from the arbitrary but also from the contingent. Much of the language we encounter and produce in most situations (including literary situations) is contingent in the sense that it depends, as Hartman (ibid.) puts it, ''on various kind of history: of the speaker, of the speaker's relation to the person spoken to, of the language created by generations of speakers, of the world in which speakers and listeners find themselves.'' Serial poems of the kind that Conte discusses (e.g., Duncan's or Creeley's) are radically contingent, not aleatory; that is, they reflect, respond to, and absorb whatever history (whether personal or collective) happens to come the poet's way; they do not depend on chance, in the sense of randomness, but rather on their own historical situatedness. This is not a negligible confusion on Conte's part, for poets resort to aleatory and arbitrary practices for much the same reason; namely, to counteract their own, inevitable situatedness and to reduce the contingency (in this sense) of language. Interesting and valuable poetry can be composed contingently, of course; but all banal poetry, we might hypothesize, is likely to have been composed contingently, in some sense. That is, banal poets submit to the contingent in the form of inherited traditions, predictable associations, clichéd language and attitudes, and so on. They are the victims of contingency. 10 ''Machines''-whether arbitrary (as in the case of Mathews) or aleatory, or some combination of the two (as in the case of Cage)-aim to counteract the contingencies of language and experience by throwing up unforeseeable collocations. Machine writing functions to circumvent and outflank contingency; it represents the alternative to submitting to the contingent.
So aleatory and arbitrary procedures prove to be allied on one side of the opposition against contingency on the other. Moreover, as Hartman implies, chance and arbitrary procedures tend to be functionally indistin-. The linguist Roy Harris notices, and disentangles, a characteristic confusion of the contingent and the mechanical in George Orwell's . Orwell, it will be recalled, imagines a version of Swift's language-machine of Lagado, a ''versificator'' operated by hacks of the Ministry of Truth; it mechanically composes sentimental songs for consumption by the proles. As Harris (: ) observes, Orwell has this exactly wrong: ''Precisely what mechanical versificators seem to be good at is hitting upon unexpected combinations of words with poetic potential; and this is doubtless because they are not limited by the ingrained run-of-the-mill verbal associations which hamper the human poet. By comparison with the versificator, it turns out to be the flesh-and-blood versifier who is 'mechanical.' '' guishable in the final textual product. Christopher Butler () already noticed this some twenty years ago: at their extremes, radical proceduralism (e.g., Boulez's integral serialism in music) and radical randomness (e.g., Cage's aleatory music) converge on one and the same effect-that of ''alloverness''-in which all stimuli become of equal importance because they lack syntax, hierarchy, or any distinction of foreground and background. Hence, Cage's willingness to combine chance and arbitrary procedures in his various writing practices involving ''found'' materials (Perloff : -). Hence, too, Mac Low's confusion (or indifference?) in ''A Note on the Methods Used in Composing & Performing Stanzas for Iris Lezak.'' In it, he characterizes poems like ''Call Me Ishmael'' as ''chance-acrostic'' or ''acrostic-stanzaic chance poems,'' when, in fact, no chance was involved in their actual composition; they are purely procedural or arbitrary poems.
Let us, then, merge the aleatory and arbitrary practices into a single category but introduce a new, better-motivated distinction within this merged category, namely a distinction between procedures and constraints. Now, if we were also to take into account the classic Jakobsonian opposition between the axis of selection and the axis of combination, we would have the beginnings of a typology of greater interest and potentially greater usefulness than any we have considered so far.
A Grid of Four Possibilities: Procedures versus Constraints, Selection versus Combination
Let's begin with some working definitions. Procedures are positive; they specify what must be done; for example, in Mac Low's acrostic method of word selection, one must select a word with an initial letter identical with the first letter of the title, then a word with an initial letter identical with the second letter of the title, and so on. Constraints, by contrast, are negative: they specify what must not be done (what must be avoided); for example, in the method Federman used in The Voice in the Closet, one must not let the line exceed sixty-eight characters and spaces, must not end the line with a blank space, must not introduce extra spaces between words, and so on. 11 To fill out our table of possibilities, we might also distinguish within the category of procedures between those involving the axis of selection and those involving the axis of combination, and we could make similar distinctions within the . Examples of extended texts in the procedural mode might include Raymond Queneau's Exercises de style, which retells the same trivial anecdote in  different styles, and Italo Calvino's Castle of Crossed Destinies, which narrativizes the sequences of images produced by laying out tarot cards at random. Examples of extended constrained texts might include La disparition [A void], Georges Perec's novel without the letter e, and Between, Christine Brooke-Rose's novel without the copula. category of constraints.This procedure thus yields four categories: selection procedures, selection constraints, combination procedures, and combination constraints. Mac Low's acrostic method, for example, could therefore be classified as a selection procedure, while Mathews' algorithm could be classified as a combination procedure. (The method of combination is fixed, but selection of units is ad lib, as long as they all belong to same level of organization.) Georges Perec's La disparition and Christine Brooke-Rose's Between (see n. ) seem to belong to the category of selection constraints, whereas Federman's Voice belongs, I suppose, to that of combination constraints.
My tentativeness in distributing examples among these four categories is indicative of the flaws in this categorizing schema. For one thing, the categories immediately spring leaks. Every procedure inevitably involves constraints, while every constraint involves procedures; inclusions imply exclusions, and vice versa. For example, Mac Low's acrostic determines which words must be selected, but it also determines which words must be excluded. Moreover, selection and combination are rarely uncoupled as completely as they are in Mathews's algorithm; thus, Mac Low's acrostic simultaneously determines selection and combination, as also do the constraints on Federman's Voice, to a certain extent. (The sixty-eight-character-per-line constraint prevents words from being freely combined, but it also prevents certain words from being selected in the first place.)
There is a further complication, for we apparently need to distinguish within the category of selection between selection proper and preselection. Preselection, according to Watten (b) involves establishing in advance of composition a restricted poetic vocabulary from which the poem will then be composed, whether freely or by fixed selection procedures.Watten's examples of preselection include Mac Low's The Pronouns, which was composed using the -word vocabulary of BASIC English, and Kit Robinson's Dolch Stanzas, based on the Dolch Basic Sight Word List, a vocabulary for sight comprehension at the second-grade level. To these examples, we might add Hartman's restricted vocabulary for poems generated by the Prose program, which comprises the five thousand most common words on the Kucera and Searle word-frequency list, somewhat edited and augmented. We might also want to include here Mac Low's compositional methods, in Stanzas for Iris Lezak, that involve, for each poem, procedures for choosing vocabulary from a preselected text. In the case of ''Call Me Ishmael,'' that preselected text is Moby-Dick; in effect, then, Moby-Dick constitutes Mac Low's vocabulary for ''Call Me Ishmael.'' But where do the limits of preselection lie? The closer we scrutinize this dimension of machine writing, the harder it is to be definitive. Watten (b), for instance, explicitly excludes the OuLiPian procedure of S+ from the category of preselection, on the grounds that it uses the dictionary itself as its poetic vocabulary. 12 The assumption here seems to be that a dictionary is unrestricted, coextensive with the language-at-large, while limited vocabularies (BASIC English, the Dolch list, the Kucera and Searle list, Moby-Dick, etc.) are restricted subsets. Elsewhere, however, Watten (a: ) extends the category of poetic vocabulary to include Clark Coolidge's The Maintains, a text based on the dictionary. Here Watten acknowledges (correctly, I think) that the dictionary is not, after all, identical with the language-at-large, but rather is ''a social construction with a material history of its own,'' and that lexicography is associated with projecting a particular version of national culture (or a particular national version of culture?); he cites, appositely enough, the case of James Murray's New English Dictionary (the OED). 13 What are we to conclude from Watten's vacillations on this point? Presumably, that to use a dictionary as a preselected, limited vocabulary (as Coolidge does in The Maintains) is already to operate a machine, whether one chooses freely from this vocabulary or uses a second machine (e.g., a procedure such as S+) to make selections from it. Once we have extended the category of preselection to include the dictionary, it is hard to know where to stop. Before us there opens out a vista of successively broader limited-vocabulary practices dwindling away to a distant vanishing point: not only the OuLiPian S+ technique but also, beyond that,Tina Darragh's dictionary-based poetics (evidently involving variants on S+); and beyond that perhaps Francis Ponge's compositional practices, which are based on his scavenging in the Littré; or Zukofsky's cannibalizing of reference works in his last, book-length poem,  Flowers (Leggott ; Perloff : -). Beyond even these (why not?), there is William Empson's polysemous poetry, inconceivable without the resources of Murray's OED. Where will it all end? Presumably in the language-at-large, wherever and whatever that may be.
Thus the category of selection, hemorrhaging examples, bleeds to death. Perhaps the time has come to shift the angle of approach from composition, the poet's side of the process, to reception, the reader's side. As we . The OuLiPian procedure involves replacing each noun in a text with the seventh noun following it in a dictionary; see Mathews and Brotchie : -. . Watten's view finds corroboration in Harris (: -). Murray's OED, according to Harris, is the climax of the project of standardizing national languages that began with the postmedieval emergence of European nation-states. In the nineteenth-century context, this lexicographical standardization project is associated with, indeed modeled on, standardization in industrial production, which dates from Eli Whitney's mass production of firearms for the U.S. government. In Harris's view, this external mechanization of language corresponds to and enables the internal mechanization (the modeling of language on machines) that will be accomplished, in our century, in the linguistic theory of Saussure and Chomsky. do so, we might also take the opportunity to try out a different kind of typology-not a grid of binary oppositions such as in the preceding typologies, but rather a scale or spectrum. One promising basis for classifying machine-generated texts would seem to be in terms of readers' awareness of the text's mechanism. Experientially, there ought to be a clear distinction between texts that advertise the fact that they have been composed mechanically and those that hide that fact. ''Cryptograms are different from anagrams,'' states Hutcheon (: ; see also Hartman : ); that is, texts requiring special inside knowledge for their solution ought to differ from texts whose solutions may be read right off the page. In the case of texts that advertise their mechanism, the reader, invited into the poet's workshop, retraces there the process of the poem's generation; poetry making is demystified, bared for the reader's inspection. However, in the second case, in which the generative mechanisms are hidden from sight, the poem's generation remains opaque, mysterious; the reader is prevented from observing the process, and may even feel deceived if he/she discovers that poem has been mechanically generated. 14 Mac Low, for one, is obviously sensitive to the difference between transparent and opaque machines, as witness his consistent insistence on specifying his methods of composition through ancillary texts such as ''A Note on the Methods Used in . . . Stanzas for Iris Lezak.'' To Mac Low, we might contrast Mathews, whose explanatory essay on the algorithm bearing his name circulated among OuLiPo insiders and appeared in collective publications of the OuLiPo group but was never published in a venue easily accessible to a general, non-OuLiPian readership-for example as the foreword or afterword to one of his own novels or volumes of poetry. 15 . Hutcheon complained () about Roussel's having hidden the mechanisms by which his texts were generated; if the purpose of machine generation is to lay bare the composition process, then why use an opaque machine? Hutcheon is actually wrong about Roussel, I think; as Foucault makes clear in his book on the latter, Roussel's posthumous pamphlet, How I Wrote Certain of My Books, in which he explains his general compositional procedures, ought to be regarded as an integral part of his texts. Moreover, continues Foucault in a more paradoxical vein, even Roussel's ambiguous death, a precondition of his pamphlet's publication, ought in this respect to be regarded as integral to his texts. Nevertheless, if Hutcheon can perhaps be rebutted in the particular case of Roussel, her general objection to opaque machine text remains a cogent one.
Resentment at having been deceived by an occluded compositional procedure partly underlies, I suspect, Jameson's (: -) notoriously unsympathetic reading of Bob Perelman's poem, ''China,'' which I discuss below. . There are also, of course, more oblique means of alerting the reader to machine composition; for instance, the writing-machines-en-abyme scattered throughout Roussel's writings. But is the distinction between knowing and not knowing how a text was generated really so crucial, in the end? Are cryptograms really all that different from anagrams? Once we know that some texts have been mechanically generated-that mechanical generation of texts is an option for poets-then we are perpetually on the lookout for traces of machine generation, perpetually suspicious. For instance, if we know for a fact that some key poems of the Language School have been composed using fixed procedures (e.g., Ron Silliman's Tjanting or Lyn Hejinian's My Life), we may well come to suspect that many other texts by these poets and their associates were composed using similar mechanical means-in whole or part, alone or in combination with other techniques. Since we may not be able conclusively to demonstrate which of these poems were composed mechanically and which were not, our experience of Language poems is likely to be colored by a kind of permanent, lingering suspicion. Over all Language poems hovers the possibility of machine composition.
Indeed, this seems to be precisely the effect for which procedural or machine-oriented poets have been striving all along: namely, making machine composition a permanent possibility that must be entertained about any and all texts. Mathews (: ) writes gleefully of ''the charm of introducing duplicity into all written texts,'' whether machine generated or not: ''Nothing can any longer be taken for granted; every word has become a banana peel.'' So the issue of whether or not the reader knows, or how unequivocally he or she knows, loses some of its urgency and specificity, merging with the more general issue of the reader's role in the production of machinegenerated poetry. That role is always a large one. The output of poetry machines (as my examples in the previous section amply illustrate) tends to be elliptical, discontinuous, ''gappy.'' In such texts, the reader's share in production necessarily expands: the reader (who else?) is the one who supplements the ellipses, connects the disconnected part, fills in the gaps, and so on. Machine-generated poetry, says Hartman (: ), is designed to ''encourag[e] the reader not just to participate in making sense but to be conscious of participating.'' But, of course, this is true of all poetry in the disjunctive mode, machine-generated or not; and much of the twentieth century's poetry, modernist and postmodernist, belongs to the disjunctive mode. At one extreme we find interactive hypertext poetry, such as Rosenberg's, in which the reader literally operates the poem machine, moving the cursor and clicking on fields and nodes to realize one particular version among all the poem's potential versions. But, after all, all poems are interactive to some degree, and all disjunctive poems are interactive to a high degree (Hartman : -) . No sharp categorial boundaries appear; instead, what emerges is a spectrum or sliding scale of readers' participation in the poem's production that ranges from some to more to most-from nondisjunctive poems that do most of the readers' work (though, of course, there is no poem that ''reads itself,'' no poem without gaps), through somewhat disjunctive poems, to highly disjunctive ones, including many that are machine generated. Along this spectrum, what varies is the ''dosage'' of interactivity, from (relatively) low to (relatively) high.
Suggestive though it is, this spectrum of interactivity in the end fails to capture the wide range of variation among types of machine writing. Nevertheless, replacing a grid of categories with a spectrum seems to be a step in the right direction. So why not retain the idea of variable dosages of participation but, returning to the writer's side of the process, apply it to the latter's involvement in machine composition?
Toward a Scale of Degrees of Writer's Involvement in the Poem's Production
The most nearly satisfactory typology of machine poetry would seem to be a scale calibrated in terms of the relative proportions of writer to machine participation in the composition of the text. We might begin with a promising distinction, proposed by Espen Aarseth (: ), among three points in the process where collaboration between human and machine might occur: first, in preprocessing, ''in which the machine is programmed, configured, and loaded by the human''; secondly, in coprocessing, in which human and machine jointly produce the text; and thirdly, in postprocessing, in which the human collaborator selects from and edits the machine's output. This distinction, though logically sound, loses some of its distinctness in actual practice, for preprocessing proves to be a constant, not a variable-the machine will always have been prepared in advance by a human operator. Moreover, coprocessing usually amounts to short cycles of postprocessing: the human collaborator processes an immediate output of the machine, perhaps supplying the machine with feedback to stimulate further output, and so on for several cycles. The poet does not stand back and wait for a final output to edit. So Aarseth's promising distinction leaves us roughly where we started, with the issue of the relative roles of writer and machine.
This issue arises with particular clarity in Hartman's account of composition with the Prose program. Comparing the ''raw'' output of the program with its ''cooked'' version, we see immediately that his practice involves a relatively high degree of postprocessing or post-editing (a technical term used in mechanical translation projects [Harris : ] ), which may include fabricating lines in the manner of the Prose program. Commenting on ''Seventy-Six Assertions and Sixty-Three Questions,'' Hartman (: ) calls our attention to the last phrase of the text's first paragraph, ''and the breath knows ghosts,'' which does not appear in the raw printout.Where did it come from? Hartman explains: ''I wrote that, not the program.Yet it's not a phrase I could imagine myself finding, except under the spell of the program's language, so dreamily detached from the immediate necessities of saying things.'' Prose proposes, evidently, but Hartman disposes; this is less a machine-generated poem than a poem made at the machine's instigation, under its ''spell.'' Some purists might regard Hartman's practice as vitiating machine composition; indeed, he seems a little troubled himself by the degree of his intervention: ''Was this fiddling with the computer's output really cheating?'' he asks rhetorically (ibid.). In fact, my sense is that much procedural or machine poetry, perhaps most of it, involves at least as much tampering as Hartman's computer poetry. Acting on this intuition, then, let's place Hartman's practice somewhere near the middle of our proposed scale. To the left of his practice we can array machine-writing practices in which the writer's role in composition is markedly less than in his case. Here, for instance, we might locate John Cage's practice of mesostics or the writing-through of other texts: for example, his ''Themes & Variations'' (described by Conte : -), the ''Roaratorio'' text (described by Perloff : -), as well as other writingsthrough in Finnegans Wake and Pound's Cantos. Cage's practice typically combines a fixed procedure (an acrostic method, but using letters in the middle of words rather than initial letters) with chance methods (a randomnumber generator or some equivalent), while reserving certain decisions to the writer (viz. how many ''wing words'' to the right and left of the mesostic word to retain in the text). Further left even than Cage, at the extreme of self-effacement, occur practices like Mac Low's, in which all local decisions are left to the operation of the machine-all postprocessing decisions, that is, for, of course, all preprocessing decisions are made by the poet. It was Mac Low, after all, who chose (preselected) the text that would supply his restricted vocabulary, as well as the template sentence (''Call me Ishmael'') that would control selection from that text; and it was also Mac Low who designed the procedure in the first place-it was he who wrote the ''program. '' 16 To the right of Hartman we can place practices in which the role of the machine or algorithm is less even than in the latter's compositions and in . In a subsequent phase of this practice, Mac Low goes further, delegating the choice of a specific procedure or program to chance. But that only pushes the arena of his participation back one level; it does not eliminate it, for, after all, he determined the repertoire of programs from which selections were made and, furthermore, designed the chance procedure for selecting from that repertoire. which the role of the writer is correspondingly greater. In the postprocessing phase, Hartman edits sentences generated by his program, but he does not smooth over discontinuities or close up gaps; quite the contrary, it is these discontinuities and gaps, artifacts of machine generation, that he particularly values. Others narrativize the artifacts thrown up by writing procedures and naturalize them, inventing a world to house them and/or integrating them into a story. (Roussel is the classic example of this practice.) 17 Right of Hartman we can also locate all those relatively free procedures and weak constraints to which contemporary poets submit their compositional practice without thereby surrendering more than a little of their creative freedom: for example, procedures for determining the number of sentences in a prose-poetic paragraph, arbitrary constraints on line length, constraints on the amount of time to be used in composing the text, and so on. 18 Having accommodated Roussel's narrativizing practice, nothing prevents us from extending the scale further to include other practices seldom associated with machine generation. A surprising candidate, perhaps, would be James Merrill's narrative trilogy, The Changing Light at Sandover (-), which is based in large part (according to the poet's own account and corroborated by those who have examined Merrill's working papers) on texts generated from letters picked out on a Ouija board by a pointer on which rested Merrill's hand and that of his partner, David Jack-. According to Foucault's authoritative account, the phrases generated by Roussel's various homonymic methods underwent two cycles of naturalization. First, the new phrase generated by the punning misconstrual of some ''found'' fragment of language was realized in a tableau or situation; then, in a second round, the resulting implausible tableau or situation was outfitted with a motivating narrative. These two cycles are reflected in the very structure of Roussel's novels: in Impressions of Africa, the mysterious tableaux are described in part one, then narrativized in part two; in Locus Solus, the descriptions and their narrativizations alternate throughout the text. . A conspicuous example of a procedure for determining the number of sentences occurs in the two editions,  and , of Lyn Hejinian's My Life, a long prose poem. The  edition, written when Hejinian was thirty-seven, comprises thirty-seven sections or paragraphs, each containing thirty-seven sentences; the  edition, written when she was forty-five, contains forty-five paragraphs of forty-five sentences each. See Perloff : -.
Among constraints on line length, surely among the most arbitrary must be the physical size of the page. The width of the page-a narrow but continuous adding-machine tapedetermined the shape of A. R. Ammons's Tape for the Turn of the Year ( []: ); a different size of tape-''another tape, a little wider, just about / pentameter''-determined the shape of his later long poem, Garbage (). The physical size of the typescript-one hundred characters wide, one hundred lines per page, one hundred pages total-also determined the form of John Ashbery's Flow Chart (), according to John Shoptaw (: -). Ashbery submitted his compositional process to yet a further constraint, namely a temporal one, determining in advance to finish composing his poem by his sixty-first birthday. For a sampling of recent procedural writing, see the ''Procedures'' special issue of Chain (Osman, Spahr, and Zweig ). son. The Ouija board appears, in this perspective, as yet another machine for generating fragments of language. 19 Using it, Merrill and Jackson produced unforeseen strings of letters, which Merrill transcribed and then subjected to heavy postprocessing. First, he reduced the strings of letters to connected discourse, inserting word breaks, rectifying spelling, identifying abbreviations, and editing out ''noise.'' Next, in a second round of postprocessing, he built up an elaborate narrative and ontological superstructure in which the machine-generated linguistic artifacts could be integrated as dialogue exchanges with otherworldly beings. 20 Our scale of human-machine interaction would thus range from maximally hands-off to maximally hands-on, from Mac Low on the far left to Merrill on the far right, with Hartman somewhere near the middle. 21 What this scale brings to the foreground is, in particular, the awareness that machine generation always involves collaboration between poet and machine.
. Of course, it could be objected that the ''machine'' in this case is indistinguishable from Merrill himself, not really external to him, in the sense that it must reflect his own more-orless unconscious decisions; or, more accurately, that it reflects the ''pooled'' unconscious of himself and his collaborator, David Jackson. This notion of a pooled unconscious is already problematic enough (should Jackson appear on the title page as coauthor of Changing Light?); but more problematic still is Merrill's claim that the Ouija texts were ''dictated'' by spirits of the dead-friends, celebrities, unknowns-as well as angels and other otherworldly beings. Without endorsing or denying Merrill's account of the otherwordly source of this language, we should simply acknowledge the observable facts of the matter: that the generation of the poem's linguistic raw materials was not under the poet's sole or complete control and that the process of generating that language was mediated (whether or not in a punning sense of the word) by a technological device-a primitive one, granted-namely, the Ouija board. . Compare the two cycles of postprocessing in Roussel's compositional practice, n.  above.
Interestingly, Merrill (: ) himself seemed willing to regard the Ouija board as a kind of language-machine. In his memoir, A Different Person, he includes a catalog of writingmachines he used, ranging from electric typewriters to a personal computer: ''In writing I have resorted, after the first scrawled phrases, to keyboards of increasing complexity, moving from Olivetti to Selectric III, from Ouija to this season's electronic wizard.'' . Noting the gigantesque proportions of many of the examples adduced above, especially as we approach the right extreme of the scale-Ashbery's -odd page Flow Chart, Merrill's three-volume Changing Light at Sandover, and so on-I feel compelled to observe that nothing prevents the machine generation of miniature texts. Notable examples include Jerome Rothenberg's gematrias, tiny poems based loosely on the principles of Jewish numerology, in which every letter is assigned a value equivalent to its position in the alphabet (in the Latin alphabet, a = , b = , c = , etc.); the letters of a word are then summed to yield a numerical value for that word. Rothenberg uses these principles to obtain the numerical value of a title word or phrase, then seeks out words with an identical value to form the text of the poem. Thus, for instance, Rothenberg (: , ) pays homage to John Cage by producing three texts with the same numerical value () as Cage's title ''Roaratorio'': ''A new / place.'' ''The leeks / & the fire,'' ''The magicians / return.'' Similarly, he pays homage to Armand Schwerner with three texts identical in value to ''The Tablets'' (): ''Fearing / to give light,'' ''The moon / will choose,'' ''Sheol / in Sodom.'' Perhaps we ought to think of these tiny writing-machines as the poetic equivalent of nanotechnology.
To put it more picturesquely, machine composition is always a cyborg, in something like Haraway's () sense: part human, part machine, a human coupled to a machine or incorporating a machine-or vice versa, a machine incorporating a human (Aarseth : ). Haraway (: ) also orients us toward another, even more provocative way of conceiving of this collaboration when she writes that ''machines can be prosthetic devices.'' In particular, she points out that writing machines-printing presses, typewriters, word processors-are prostheses, so why not ad hoc writing machines such as Mac Low's acrostics or Cage's mesostics or Mathews's algorithm or Merrill's Ouija board?
A prosthesis, in David Wills's () provocative account, disturbingly combines natural and artificial, human and mechanical, the spontaneous and the contrived, overriding the distinction between these categories. Its logic is precisely that of the Derridean supplement (of which it is, indeed, a version): it simultaneously extends a human organ or capability and replaces it-think of a prosthetic limb. Word processing, for instance, is prosthetic in the sense that it can be described as ''a human attached to a writing machine'' (i.e., a cyborg); it supplements writing in the Derridean sense of simultaneously extending and replacing handwriting. Wills points out (ibid.: ) in particular that word processing ''renders . . . expedient'' certain ''operations of detachability,'' namely, ''cutting and pasting, the possibility of endless rearranging and grafting of textual material.'' A prosthetic device itself, it enables prosthetic practices of writing.
In the light of Wills's elaboration of the notion of prosthesis, all the practices of machine composition described above can be conceived of as prosthetic. Thus, for example, procedures such as Mathews's algorithm are prosthetic in the sense that they supplement (in the specialized Derridean sense) the internalized rules of spontaneous composition; they simultaneously augment and replace those rules. Poetic vocabularies (as described by Watten) are prosthetic with respect to a poet's internalized vocabulary: they supplement (augment and replace) that vocabulary. But of all the machine texts I have described, it is Federman's Voice in the Closet that most spectacularly dramatizes and allegorizes its own prosthetic character. Involving literal collaboration between writer and machine, Voice amounts to a human attached to an IBM Selectric typewriter-a Federmachine. Its rules (sixty-eight or ninety-five characters and/or spaces per line, etc.) supplement the rules of (respectively) English or French. Moreover, Voice had originally been designed to function as part of another novel. It was to have been folded into chapter six of Federman's Twofold Vibration, but the publisher (Indiana University Press) insisted on excluding it. Should we say that the publisher amputated Voice, separating it from the body of Twofold Vibration, of which it had been an integral part? Consequently, Voice was published separately by a different publisher, actually in advance of Twofold Vibration itself. Thus Voice is simultaneously the limb or organ missing from Twofold Vibration-its ''ghost limb,'' an absence conspicuously marked-and the prosthetic device that supplements Twofold Vibration.
Some Consequences of Machine Composition
The most direct and obvious consequence of the phenomenon we can now call prosthetic poetry is its undermining, or at least dilution, of authority. If the poet renounces part of his or her prerogatives, sharing his or her authority with a machine (actual or virtual), then who stands behind the words? Who's in charge here? What if nobody is? As Hartman (: ) sensibly observes, confronted with a text, readers always try to deduce the profile of its author, and they usually succeed. But what happens when they know in advance or, more troubling still, find out later, that that the profile is blurred, being shared between poet and machine? 22 In theory, of course, we have long since acclimated ourselves to the notion of dispersed and decentered authority, of the authorial self diffused throughout the intertext or throughout infrapsychological structures or routines (what Deleuze and Guattari call ''desiring-machines''). In theory, we are reconciled to such ideas; in practice, however, it's apt to be a different story, as witness the embarrassment, scandal, and resentment that so often greet machine-generated poetry. Anyone who has introduced such poetry to students knows what kind of resentment it elicits. The resentment is hardly less, though the tone is likely to be even more hysterical, when journalistic reviewers confront so-called interactive, machine-mediated, or machinegenerated writing. 23 Perhaps resentment and panic are only to be expected from neophytes or aesthetic conservatives such as reviewers, but what are we to make of sophisticated theorists who succumb? This seems to be what happened in the . Perhaps we can conceive of prosthetic poetry as a kind of Turing test of poetry: If the machine imitates a human author's linguistic behavior so perfectly that it can be mistaken for an author, then does it count as an author? And if not, why not? . See, for instance, the panic attack suffered by the veteran New York mes reviewer Michiko Kakutani () in the face of interactive hypertext writing. It is the hypertext author's renunciation of total responsibility for meaning production, her or his delegation of (part of ) that responsibility to the reader, that seems to panic her: ''Once upon a time, in the pre-hypertext past, art aspired . . . to shape [life] , intensify it, imprint it with a single person's vision. It represented an individual's attempt to find order in chaos, a pattern in the carpet. Hypertext smashes that old conception of art: the artist is dead, it suggests, and the rug is patternlessthe reader alone is left to make sense of a senseless world.'' notorious (and overdiscussed) case of Jameson's (: -) misconstrual of Language poetry as represented by Bob Perelman's ''China'' (see Hartley : -; Perelman : -, ). Jameson and the Language poets ought to have been natural allies, but something seems to have shortcircuited his reception of Perelman's poem, which he presents as an illustration of ''schizophrenic'' disjunctiveness. Having offered a rather plausible reading of ''China'' as ''in some curious and secret way a political poem'' (: )-its somewhat occluded referent being Maoist China-Jameson springs a surprise: ''China,'' it transpires, is a (mildly) procedural poem. Perelman set himself the task of fabricating English-language captions for illustrative drawings-Jameson specifies, mistakenly, photographs (Perelman : , n. )-in a Chinese-language book he could not actually read. Each line of ''China'' constitutes one such caption; thus, the poem amounts to a series of ekphrases, their order and, to some extent, their content determined by the ''found'' object, the Chinese book, which functions for Perelman as Moby-Dick did for Mac Low. Jameson's resentment of this secret procedure is never made explicit, let alone theorized, but it lingers in his comparison of Perelman's method with the simulacral deceptiveness of photorealism and, of course, in his scurrilous characterization of Perelman's disjunctiveness as schizophrenic. An unacknowledged aesthetic ideology seems to lie just beneath the surface of Jameson's criticism: a text somehow lacks legitimacy if it does not spontaneously arise in the poet as self-expression. What is this, if not an unacknowledged Romantic aesthetic ideology, harbored in the breast of a theorist sophisticated enough to know better?
Prosthetic poetry may also have important consequences for the generic identity of poetry. The aesthetics of prosthesis seems not to differentiate between poetry and prose; indeed it systematically blurs that genre distinction-the output of algorithms is just as likely to be one as the other. Mathews's algorithm can be used to combine and recombine units of plot as easily as units of language or lines of poetry; his novel Cigarettes (), I suspect, was plotted by using the algorithm, or something very like it. Federman's Voice in the Closet, though a writing-machine text, is usually regarded (including by Federman himself ) as a novel. Many of the most conspicuous practitioners of machine composition are usually identified as novelists, including Roussel, Walter Abish, and OuLiPians such as Raymond Queneau, Georges Perec, Italo Calvino, Jacques Roubaud, and Mathews himself. Other practitioners (e.g., Mac Low, members of the Language school) are usually regarded as poets; still others (e.g., Cage) fit neither category. Perloff (: -), in her discussion of procedural aesthetics, treats the distinction between prose and verse as one of very minor relevance; her ex-amples include Perec's novel La vie mode d'emploi and Hejinian's generically ambiguous prose text, My Life, side by side with the poetry of Zukofsky's  Flowers and the performance text of Cage's Roaratorio. Nor is there even any reason to respect the boundaries between verbal art and other artistic media. Wills (: -) discusses Peter Greenaway's films in terms of prosthetic poetics.
Thus, prosthesis is precisely one of the areas where historical genre distinctions erode; what remains is an extra-or supra-or infra-generic practice of writing, which may include discourses of nonverbal media. Prosthesis seems to promise (or threaten) a realignment of genre categories.
That being the case, I offer the following modest (or mischievous?) proposal: Why not reassign genre terms in the light of the realignment brought about by prosthesis? We might, then, consider reserving the term poetry for all forms of machine-generated text and assign all types of spontaneous (i.e., nonmechanical, nonprosthetic) composition to the category prose.This practice would have the effect of grouping machine-generated poems such as ''Call Me Ishmael'' and ''Seventy-Six Assertions'' with machine-generated works like The Voice in the Closet and the novels of Roussel, Mathews, Perec and others. It would also split what we now know as poetry into two groups: all machine-generated texts, broadly interpreted to include all rhymed and metrical forms, would remain in the poetry category, while all spontaneous forms, including most free verse, would henceforth be grouped with prose.
Notwithstanding the unlikelihood of its ever being implemented, this little thought experiment reminds us that one of art's functions, in the twentieth century at least, has been precisely to ''estrange'' art-to put the entire institution of art in a strange (i.e., unfamiliar) light. New writing can (and ideally should) have the effect of reorienting our attention toward the literary institution and the entire history of literature; it reshuffles the literaryhistorical deck (as Eliot said in one way in ''Tradition and the Individual Talent,'' and Borges in another way in ''Kafka and His Precursors''). In a sense, this is new writing's function in the larger scheme of things: to renew (by estranging) old writing (see Harris : ). In the spirit of art as the estrangement and reorientation of attention, let's try a thought experiment: What if machine composition were not (as it currently appears to be) a marginal phenomenon but was actually central to the history of writing? Or what if it were regarded, not as a kind of fluke (as I suppose it currently tends to be regarded), but rather as the logical outcome of preceding literary-historical developments or the realization of the potential of earlier practices? In what different light does the history of poetry, in particular, appear, if viewed from this angle? a revision of Yeats: ''all the ladders start,'' not in the ''foul rag-and-bone shop,'' but in the machine shop of the heart.
When the poet submits to dictation from the Muse, whether supernatural, internalized, or the ''virtual Muse'' of the machine, we understand this act as a figure for submission to the genius of language itself-or to the language-machine. In the estranging light of machine composition, all language use appears as a cyborg phenomenon-a human being coupled to a machine-or as a prosthesis.Wills (: ) writes that ''language inaugurates a structure of the prosthetic when the first word projects itself from the body into materiality, or vice versa; by . . . constituting itself as otherness, articulation of the othernesses that constitute it, language is a prosthesis. Every utterance is as if spoken from a skateboard, written on crutches, relying on the prosthetic supplement.'' 25 Mechanical composition functions in this context as a scale model, a heuristic device: it figures in miniature the larger language-machine, and it helps render that language-machine visible.
Unless, of course, this is all simply mistaken. According to the maverick linguistic theorist and historian Roy Harris (), the notion that language is a machine-whether internalized as cognitive machinery or externalized as the system of la langue-is a case of our allowing ourselves to be victimized by our own metaphors. In Harris's iconoclastic view, language is nothing at all like a machine; it is, rather, a social behavior integral to other social behaviors (see also Toolan ) . Only the accidental convergence of the machine metaphor with high-visibility developments in cybernetic technology has made it possible for us to take the metaphor literally. ''Language is a prosthesis'' is, in this view, nothing but pernicious mystification.
The peroration of an essay in poetics is hardly the place to try to adjudicate between two such compelling views of language as Wills's and Harris's. Whichever view is right (and perhaps they are both right, in something like the sense in which light is correctly described as both wave and particle), it is mechanical composition, prosthetic poetry, that has served to bring into view, and into sharp focus, these high-stakes issues about the nature of language itself. . One recalls Burroughs's slogan, popularized in a song by Laurie Anderson: ''Language is a virus from outer space.'' ''A virus''-that is, the most machinelike of life-forms, a shell surrounding some genetic material-is poised on the border between animate and inanimate, life and machine. Moreover, the electron microscope reveals how closely it resembles a lunar lander: it is ''from outer space''-that is, external to us, alien. ''Language is a virus from outer space,'' therefore, is a postmodernist version of the Muse from a writer who invented and applied writing-machines in his own textual practice. 
